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Abstract 
The European Union is often considered as a prime example of a liberal regulatory 
state. We argue, however, that being limited to the regulatory policy does not 
prevent the European Commission from pursuing political aims going beyond 
market efficiency. We draw up two ideal-type perspectives of market regulation – 
being either efficiency or equality enhancing – that differ systematically in terms of 
rationale, degree of intervention, patterns of stakeholder access and conflict within 
the regulator. We trace these aspects in three financial services initiatives on the 
registration and supervision of reinsurers, equal treatment in financial services and 
the regulation of consumer credit. Our analyses suggest that there is scope for 
equality-enhancing re-regulation when proactive agents proceed decidedly on the 
basis of social-treaty concerns and frame regulatory beneficiaries as market 
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Limited possibilities for taxation and meagre budgets severely restrict the EU 
regarding the pursuit of wider social goals through governmental redistribution of 
existing resources. Rather than as a positive state, the EU has been characterized 
as the leading example of a liberal regulatory state that focuses mainly on the 
correction of various market failures (Majone, 1993, 1997). The fact that EU 
regulation emerged increasingly as a response to the privatization of utilities 
(Grande, 2011) has added to the view that the Union’s first and foremost regulatory 
aim is the efficiency of the Single European Market. 
However, the traditional welfare state at the national level has also partly relied on 
regulatory components (Mabbett, 2009; Leisering, 2011a) while the definition of the 
regulatory does not necessarily imply particular political goals (Levi-Faur, 2012: 
esp. 14-16). Influential authors have identified a European social policy, although 
being of the regulatory type (Leibfried, 2010; Falkner et al., 2005). Clearly, EU 
regulation covers increasingly broad social themes, including, for example, 
consumers, the environment and energy (Knill et al., 2003; Vogel, 2003; Coen et 
al., 2008). Moreover, the demand for European regulation with a more social face 
has increasingly been on the agenda since the failed referendums in 2005 and 
since the financial crisis that put the spotlight on the downsides of unfettered 
market forces. So while EU decision-making has a strong regulatory thrust, 
regulation is not automatically tied to the (political) ambition for liberalization, but 
may also be a vehicle for attaining distributive goals. Consequently, it is relevant to 
ask for the conditions under which EU market regulation pursues social goals that 
go beyond mere market efficiency. 
We tackle this question with regard to the European Commission. The long-term 
perspective of its regulatory staff, its unique access to broad policy expertise and, 
especially, its formal monopoly of legislative initiative all provide the Commission 
with substantial influence over the contents of European regulation (Princen, 2009; 
Tsebelis et al., 2000). However, against the background of external constraints – 
most notably the provisions of EU treaties, as well as political preferences in the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament – the Commission must keep up 
the appearance of impartiality and thus has reason to mask the outright pursuit of 
social goals. Following an ideal-type distinction between efficiency-enhancing and 
equality-enhancing regulation, we argue in Section 2 that the Commission’s 
ambitions can nevertheless be identified if we take the systematic differences 
between the regulatory processes into account.  
This claim is supported by comparing three short histories of drafting processes on 
financial services regulations presented in Section 3. Initially, the European 
financial services market could have been realized through liberalization and the 
simple application of the freedoms of movement enshrined in the EU treaties. 
However, especially since the publication of the EU Green Book on the financial 
services market in the late 1990s, European regulation of the sector abounds 
(Posner et al., 2010: 400). In shifting from the coverage of purely commercial 
activities to retail financial services for private consumers, ‘the FSAP [Financial 
Service Action Plan] represented a change in EU strategy away from market 
opening measures towards common regulatory measures’ (Quaglia, 2010: 1007). 
These efforts may only be a consequence of further market integration, but they 
still make financial services a promising policy area for studying regulatory 
capacities that go beyond market efficiency and the regulatory processes that push 
the Commission towards the pursuit of wider social concerns. We trace the 
theoretically developed characteristics with respect to three regulatory processes 
on financial intermediaries, equal treatment in service markets and consumer 
credit.  
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The article generates two expectations regarding the conditions under which the 
European Commission places a more social European market on the legislative 
agenda. While its capacity remains limited to the regulatory section of the overall 
social policy spectrum, the Commission can and does proactively redistribute rights 
1) where this is pushed by specific internal actors who are in turn able to draw on a 
decidedly social-treaty base and frame the societal beneficiaries as market 
participants, and 2) where rights rather than resources are at stake, typically to the 
benefit of diffuse stakeholder interests. Under these conditions, it becomes 
possible to propose equality-enhancing regulation that goes beyond the aim of 
more efficient competition. 
Conceptualizing regulation: Market efficiency and 
wider social equality 
This article seeks to contribute to the debate on whether and under which 
conditions Europe’s markets can be embedded ‘within a broader set of social and 
political rules and cultural understandings that make them work not only more 
efficiently but also more equitably, with greater security for market and nonmarket 
participants and in tune with a variety of other social purposes’ (Caporaso et al., 
2009: 579). Existing research on this question differs along two perspectives. 
Firstly, it focuses on the implications of EU decisions for national welfare-state 
models. EU integration’s lack of social embeddedness is ascribed to the systemic 
features of supranational decision-making, which prevent the reproduction of 
welfare states at the supranational level (Scharpf, 1999, 2010). Our interest here is 
more circumscribed, focusing on the re-regulatory capacity of day-to-day policy-
making in Brussels. In other words, we accept the premise that the EU is a 
regulatory state with very limited capabilities for redistributing resources directly 
and that its regulatory instruments are constrained by the nature and interests of 
the inter-institutional process. However, any European market regulation must start 
with a policy proposal by the Commission, which in turn defines the issues as well 
as the strategic preferences that govern inter-institutional negotiations (Princen, 
2009; Tsebelis et al., 2000). So if Commission proposals are not a priori equality 
enhancing when adopted by the Commission, the chances are low that such a 
policy orientation will be produced later in the policy cycle. Focusing on Europe’s 
central agenda-setter is thus crucial for understanding the scope for and the 
degree to which EU regulation can be embedded in a social dimension.  
A second dividing line in the literature runs between arguments about the natural or 
spontaneous emergence of market embeddedness and contributions highlighting 
the necessity for political construction in the pursuit of distributive goals. The 
former perspective is often evoked in relation to ECJ rulings in the area of anti-
discrimination policies or cross-border health care (Hervey et al., 2007; more 
critical Höpner et al., 2012), but here we are concerned with intentional political 
construction. We start from the premise that market embedding is not an 
autonomous process, rather depends on specific conditions linked to decisive 
regulatory actors such as the European Commission. 
These decisions already highlight the fact that the Commission only occupies the 
middle section of a larger social policy continuum that spans from completely 
unfettered markets, on the one side, to an autocratic distribution of resources along 
social justice criteria, on the other. Strictly speaking, only a section somewhere in 
between these extremes is filled with regulatory policy where authoritarian 
intervention is based on rules stated in general terms. But also within this section, 
the regulator will explicitly or implicitly decide on ‘who will be indulged and who 
deprived’ (Lowi, 1964: 690-1). In this view, regulation makes a socially relevant 
difference (Braithwaite et al., 2007) and the narrow section should already provide 
crucial insights concerning the conditions under which a policy outcome will be 
situated more towards one or the other end of the entire social policy continuum. 
Even when we only look at regulatory means, the outcome can be markets of very 




different social quality. We start from a rough distinction between two ideal-type 
perspectives on the organization and purpose of markets as a mode of social 
interaction: they may be either seen to produce the optimal allocation of resources 
in the equilibrium of economic supply and demand or as a socially constructed 
mechanism that balances competing values and demands.  
The classical perspective of welfare economics starts from the utility of individual 
actors in the marketplace. It assumes that the socially optimal allocation of 
resources is attained when no individual can be made better off without 
disadvantaging others. Such a Pareto-efficient outcome is reached through the 
equilibrium of supply and demand, which in turn can only be achieved in a perfectly 
competitive market where the individual market participants try to maximize their 
individual welfare (Stiglitz, 1986). But even from this perspective, some regulation 
is required to preserve the market (Weingast, 1995), for instance with respect to 
property rights or contract certainty. In practice, markets are hardly commensurate 
with a model of perfect competition, for example where information is 
asymmetrically distributed among the market participants (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, 
classical welfare economics considers market regulation to be warranted where 
markets fail, externalities accrue or other imperfections prevent optimal decisions 
on the part of individual market participants (see, e.g.,Majone, 1996: esp. 28-30). 
In this perspective, regulation is seen only as a second-best solution to the 
outcomes a fully competitive and undistorted market would produce. 
A second perspective on market regulation criticizes this purely economic view 
from normative points of departure (see Prosser, 2006 or; McVea, 2005). 
Approaches in this vein argue that market efficiency is qualitatively different from 
other, equally legitimate purposes of social interaction, such as social justice. Here, 
regulation does not target perfect competition in markets, but rather aims to alter 
their very quality by changing the rules under which individual transactions will be 
carried out. Instead of guaranteeing the mere pursuit of individual welfare, 
regulation addresses misallocation from a moral point of view, and is thus seen as 
a ‘balancing of competing values setting out the sort of society we wish to live in’ 
(Prosser, 2006: 375). This is consistent with the distinction between economic and 
social regulation that has figured prominently in the US debate on regulatory 
market interventions (cf. Reagan, 1987: esp. ch. 2). In the context of the EU, this 
approach has also been described as ‘market cushioning policies’ (Sbragia et al., 
2008: 133; Sbragia, 2000; similarly, ‘market shaping’ Quaglia, 2010; ‘extended 
regulation’ Leisering, 2011b: 6). While economic regulation aims at freeing 
competitive forces, social regulation is primarily motivated by problems that often 
cannot be solved by an increase in economic competition alone. Rather than 
targeting the individual pursuit of welfare, social regulation aims at protecting 
broader societal groups from systematic disadvantages they may encounter in 
competitive markets (Ramsay, 1995). 
We argue that the two perspectives should result in different models of regulation. 
Of course, in practice regulators often simultaneously face demand to create 
efficient markets that minimise burdens on industry and to create societies that are 
more just, equal and socially cohesive – and thus differ from the outcomes 
produced by market forces alone. In practice, thus we expect to see various 
mixtures “of interconnected and interdependent social and economic values, and 
that the distinction […] lies in the primacy of the values it is designed to advance 
and the purpose it is designed to achieve” (Windholz et al., 2013: 25), Yet, while 
analytical boundaries might be very fuzzy at times deriving ideal-types allows us to 
point out more specific empirical implications which ultimately lead us to a finer-
grained perspective on the European Commission’s choices and options in 
embedding European markets in wider social concerns. The discussion so far 
yields the following two ideal types of regulation:  
In the first perspective – termed ‘efficiency enhancing’ – regulation is perceived as 
necessary to increase the immediate functioning of markets by countering market 
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failures or imperfections understood as non-optimal transactions. Regulation 
should be expected where markets face a lack of competition due to monopolies, 
negative externalities or informational asymmetries. The beneficiaries of regulation 
are individual market participants. 
In the second perspective – termed ‘equality enhancing’ – market regulation is 
perceived as necessary to deliver broader societal goals and operates with a more 
long-term perspective on market gains. Such regulation is motivated by other goals 
than purely increasing competition. Structurally weaker parties in market 
transactions are the beneficiaries of regulation.  
Most importantly, distinguishing these two ideal-types is at odds with the seminal 
perspective on the regulatory state, which is most often portrayed as the polar 
opposite of the positive (welfare) state (Majone, 1997: 149; Levi-Faur, 2012: 12-
15). In this account, the main function of the positive state is Keynesian 
macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution. Majone’s regulatory state by 
contrast puts administrative and economic performance first – it is ‘efficiency 
enhancing’. In between these extremes, the ‘equality-enhancing’ perspective we 
develop here implies that there is a socially and analytically relevant middle 
ground. And this middle ground should differ from both the liberal regulatory state 
and the positive state not only with respect to long-term outcomes ‘but with regard 
to access, procedures and organization’ (Leisering, 2011b: 258, original 
emphasis). However, what follows from Majone’s original distinction for a ‘state’ 
model that sits in between, and that starts with a clear (re)distributive function 
operates through regulation only? We argue that if the goals of regulation differ, as 
the original distinction of the ideal types suggests, then also the process of rule-
making at the EU level should deviate from the typical regulatory state model in at 
least four respects.  
First, in his seminal conceptualization of the regulatory state, Majone argues that 
redistributive consequences result from ‘potential policy constraints rather than 
policy objectives’ for regulators (Majone, 1997: 162). In this efficiency-enhancing 
world, policy-makers try to avoid costs for any market participant by striving for a 
solution that is beneficial to all. In contrast, the equality-enhancing perspective 
implies that actors will focus on the creation of benefits for particular market 
participants that may or may not imply costs for others – this is in line with taxing 
and redistribution under the positive state. Rather than a constraint, (re)distributive 
consequences should become the rationale of regulation in an equality-enhancing 
model. 
Secondly, the envisaged structure of the regulatory interventions should differ. In 
an efficiency-enhancing world, and in line with the goal of individual choice, as 
many decisions as possible are delegated to the market participants themselves, 
so that ‘indirect government’ best describes the mode of regulatory production as 
well as the regulatory contents (Majone, 1997: 146-8). By contrast, the equality-
enhancing perspective implies that markets produce skewed outcomes so that the 
regulators will take as many decisions as possible themselves and try to set 
conclusive rules for the issue in question. 
Thirdly, the two ideal types should differ with respect to the underlying conflict 
dimension and the related integration of external stakeholders into the regulatory 
process. Especially in the EU multilevel system, stakeholder integration is best 
understood as support from allies. The positive state is typically associated with 
corporatist patterns structured around class conflict. Capital and labour are granted 
access at the level of organized interests (Cioffi, 2009: 244). Under such 
representational monopolies, access to the regulator is biased (Schmitter et al., 
1979). Majone’s regulatory state, by contrast, moves away from this central political 
dynamic and implies competition among single-issue interest groups. Following 
pluralist theory (Truman, 1951), regulators grant equal access to the different sides 
of the debate and act as neutral arbiters searching for the equilibrium solution. The 




influence of external stakeholders might be biased, but the bias should not result 
from prefixed access patterns, rather from competition between the interests. 
Under the equality-enhancing model, stakeholder access should cease to be 
neutral without, however, focusing only on the conflicts underlying the capitalist-
labour divide. Where normative imbalances among pluralist contending interests 
are the starting point of regulation, regulators should grant privileged access for 
those groups whose interest they see specifically at stake. The equality-enhancing 
model is thus more consistent with the neo-pluralist view on interest-group 
integration (cf. Dunleavy et al., 1987). 
Lastly, the two possible worlds of regulation should differ concerning the way 
actors within the Commission interact. As the EU’s agenda-setter, the Commission 
is not a unitary actor when proposing regulation, rather different interests prevail. 
The position finally proposed is the outcome of a long internal process 
characterized by multiple and often conflictual interactions (Hartlapp et al., 2013). 
In the seminal conception of the regulatory state, governmental actors ‘usually cast 
their arguments in the language of 'regulatory science' rather than in the more 
traditional language of interest or class policies’ (Majone, 1997: 157). Arguments 
should focus on technically ‘best’ solutions, and actors should adhere to ‘a 
problem-solving rather than a bargaining style of decision-making’ (ibid: 162). By 
contrast, the equality-enhancing perspective emphasizes normative differences in 
the quality of markets and should thus be much more prone to political conflict and 
more fundamental political exchange among actors. 
Table 1: Ideal-type models of regulation in between unfettered markets and 
the positive welfare state 




Regulation Positive State 
Rationale Competition Market failure Redistribution  of rights 
Redistribution  
of resources 
















structure Price Expertise driven Norm driven Party driven 
Summarized in Table 1, we can now identify equality-enhancing regulation as a 
distinct option for rule-makers. It is located in between unfettered markets and the 
idealized positive welfare state and, more importantly, it distinguishes itself from 
the efficiency-enhancing regulation usually associated with the regulatory state not 
only in terms of policies proposed, but also with regard to the regulatory processes 
at work. On the basis of these procedural differences, we can analyse whether the 
European Commission actually pursues equality-enhancing regulation and what 
scope there is for the social embeddedness of Europe’s internal market. 
Tracing equality-enhancing regulation in the European 
Commission 
The outcome we are interested in is the extent to which a policy is equality 
enhancing, whereas the market-failure perspective in the classical regulatory state 
model of the Commission serves as our baseline expectation. In other words, our 
empirical starting point is the Commission’s regulatory output and, more 
specifically, the degree to which a Commission proposal deviates from the 
regulatory status quo in the name of efficiency or social equality.  
In order to highlight how the regulatory processes leading to these outcomes differ 
systematically we selected three cases from a broader project that studies 
decision-making within the Commission on the basis of semi-structured interviews 
Hartlapp and Rauh ● The Commission’s internal conditions for social re-regulation 
 
31
conducted in Brussels between 2006 and 2009 with involved Commission officials 
from different Directorates-General and hierarchical levels.1 
Firstly, the proposed directive on financial intermediaries, by regulating registration 
and consumer rights, seeks to establish an efficient single market for insurers 
distributing financial products on their own account. Secondly, the proposed 
directive on equal treatment in the access to and supply of goods and services for 
men and women and for all persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation addresses the disadvantages facing specific groups in 
financial markets, for example with respect to insurance contributions and benefits 
or the conditions for loans. And, thirdly, the final act seeks to protect vulnerable 
consumers by regulating creditor obligations concerning the advertisement, 
conclusion and termination of consumer credit agreements. Whereas the first 
proposal follows an efficiency-enhancing logic, the second two cases lean towards 
the equality-enhancing side. Tracing the three regulatory processes, we work our 
way through the four dimensions of the two ideal types derived above. While the 
very notion of ideal-types excludes the possibility of finding them empirically in pure 
form, we should find evidence that decision-making in the Commission deviates 
from the classical regulatory-state model by following the logic of distributing 
political benefits, neo-pluralist and intentionally skewed interest group access, as 
well as substantial internal conflict instead of efficiency-enhancing problem-solving. 
The models in practice: Drafting European regulations 
on financial services 
A first case that provides insights on the Commission’s internal conditions for re-
regulation is the regulation of reinsurers and financial intermediaries as institutions 
that redistribute financial products on their own account – such as travel agencies 
or car dealers.2 Although a forerunner directive with a narrower scope as well as a 
non-binding recommendation already existed, the regulatory logic was one of 
interface management rather than common-market regulation. The size of national 
markets differed, with in some cases more than 50 percent of insurance being 
distributed via intermediaries (the figures are especially high in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, but are low in Denmark). National rules varied 
‘with regard to the access and purchase of the activity, in particular with regard to 
financial capacities [and] professional relations’ (COM109), de facto confining 
intermediaries to their national markets. Especially with respect to consumer 
interests, member states typically had national rules in place. Accordingly, 
commercial actors faced substantial uncertainty regarding which rules to apply in 
cross-border markets (Dassesse, 1997:108). 
Commissioner Monti first announced the new regulation in February 1997 (AE, 
1997a) and the proposal was adopted in 2000. For DG MARKT, the rationale was 
to boost the retail market in insurance for private individuals through further 
liberalization, much along the lines this had been achieved for the wholesale 
market of large industrial and commercial risks. To this end, one part of the 
proposed directive established a single registration system in the member state of 
origin which harmonized the recognition of insurance agents and brokers 
throughout Europe (a regulatory logic also applied to other directives, Quaglia, 
2010: 1030) and went hand in hand with professional requirements and 
supervision through the country of origin. A drafting official summarized this 
rationale as follows: ‘we did it, because it was worth for the industry and also to 
enforce the internal market. It was a very heavy case, where not a lot of work was 
                                                                                                         
1 In order to preserve interviewee anonymity, we refer to the interviews as ‘COM1’, ‘COM2’, etc. 
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on insurance mediation 
(COM(2000)511). 




necessary from the internal market viewpoint’ (COM109). The other group of 
provisions considered a necessary ingredient for making retail markets for 
intermediaries function efficiently was to strengthen the position of consumers by 
introducing information and disclosure rights as well as facilities for complaints: ‘[I]t 
will increase the choice of insurance products available to customers and help 
ensure they can trust the advice they are getting from intermediaries’ 
(Commissioner Bolkestein, cited in: AE, 2002, likewise COM109). Clearly, in this 
case, consumer protection was not sought as a right per se, but to prevent the 
failure of a common market for financial mediation and thus qualifies as efficiency 
enhancing.  
Different sources provide evidence that drafting did not take place behind closed 
doors and that external stakeholders were relevant in explaining both the choice of 
a binding instrument with a broad scope that included small intermediaries, as well 
as the other substantial provisions of the proposal (AE, 1997a, COM109). 
Following the efficiency-enhancing model, DG MARKT consulted broadly not only 
across several member states and the EP, but also across stakeholders from the 
financial services industry, notably the European Insurance Committee (EIC), the 
Association of European Cooperative Insurers (AECI), intermediaries such as the 
International Association of Insurance and Reinsurance Intermediaries (BIPAR) 
and customers represented by the European Bureau of Consumers’ Unions 
(BEUC; COM109). These single-issue interest groups finally all found their 
positions represented in the proposal. The binding provisions clearly open the 
market for cross-country provision of services and thereby foster competition 
between professional insurance intermediaries more strongly than earlier, non-
binding recommendations. And they do so ‘within a clear framework of common 
rule to protect the consumer’ (BEUC Director Jim Murray, cited in AE, 1997a; 
similarly BIPAR in AE, 1997b). 
Drafting inside the Commission stretched over a period of five to six years and 
different portfolios were involved (COM109). Although DG SANCO, especially, was 
reported to have argued for consumer interests to be reflected, the actors involved 
did not perceive the interaction as being conflictual and reported that all internal 
comment was taken on board (COM109). In combination with the obviously 
negligible interest at the political level for this rather technical directive, the process 
followed a problem-solving logic. 
The second case is the promotion of equality of opportunity for disadvantaged 
groups in services, especially financial services. Traditionally, at the EU level anti-
discrimination regulation had been developed as part of labour law. Legislation on 
actuarial factors differed starkly across member states, with the unisex principle 
mainly in place in the Scandinavian countries, France and Slovenia. The UK also 
had unisex tariffs for private health insurance, whereas car coverage showed sharp 
differences (AE, 2004). After the Amsterdam Treaty had introduced a new basis for 
legal action with article 13, the Commission proactively sought to extend equivalent 
principles to other areas, including the financial services market. 
The Commission proposal3 is equality enhancing in that it does away with practices 
of unequal treatment in terms of access to the insurance cover provided or in the 
level of benefits paid out. Such practices – most pronounced in motor, health and 
life insurance – are efficient from a purely market point of view, but they 
disadvantage societal groups on the basis of factors that lie beyond personal 
control. Against this background, in 2003 the Commission had proposed a directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between women and men regarding 
access to and supply of goods and services that was adopted as directive 
2004/113/EC. In 2008, a more far-reaching proposal was drafted by DG EMPL. If it 
                                                                                                         
3 Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE implementing the principle of equal treatment between women 
and men in the access to and supply of goods and services (COM(2003)657). 
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becomes law, this proposal would extend the quest for equal treatment between 
the sexes in services to all persons, irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation.4 Taking the effect of the directive already adopted and the 
pending proposal together would mean that, in principle, insurers and banks will no 
longer be able to use age, sex or disability in a way that discriminates against 
groups with these particular characteristics. This will increase costs both for 
insurers and for those consumers who have hitherto benefitted from the unequal 
market relationship. Moreover, the very fact that the Commission has intervened to 
explicitly extend the market to those who were previously excluded by law or in 
practice underlines the goal of creating more equal markets above and beyond 
what could be considered economically efficient.  
With respect to the rationale characterizing the regulatory process in this second 
case, we find that while market inefficiencies were invoked in the debate, the core 
ambition of the drafting DG was clearly to alter the quality of this market in 
accordance with a political reasoning targeting greater equality. Enhancing the 
efficiency of markets by responding to changing environments and countering 
unfair practices was certainly on the agenda of the Commission, especially in view 
of persisting implementation difficulties (COM125, AE, 2007). However, we also 
note clearly voiced criticism that under the envisaged regulations the opposite 
outcome would be the case, because premiums would ultimately be forced upward 
(Minder, 2003b; Parker, 2003). Besides, the goal of increasing equality in markets 
was also explicitly voiced by the Commission. The proposal is described in official 
documents as a necessary ‘signal of solidarity between women and men in 
European society’ (Secrétariat Général, 2003:21) and as the ‘result of a real moral 
and legal obligation’ (Proposal, p.4). Commissioner Diamantopoulou stressed that 
there were ‘political reasons for not accepting gender as an element justifying a 
differentiation of the treatment of individuals in the access to the supply of goods 
and services’, as well as the signalling function of the act for European society 
(Secrétariat Général, 2003:21). 
As suggested by our ideal-type model, this case was characterized by biased 
stakeholder access to favour presumably weaker parts in the regulated market 
relationships. In the run-up to the negotiation process in 2003, DG EMPL had very 
actively used and encouraged changes in interest-group organizations to create a 
broad front against opposition from those who wanted to keep more expensive 
discrimination grounds out of the discussed acts. Already prior to concrete drafting, 
the Commission had incentivized existing and scattered NGOs representing 
minorities to join forces in an umbrella organization which was not only consulted 
but also substantially influenced the legislative proposal. ‘It was certainly strategic 
to involve civil society groups more than social partners […] We saw the potential 
victims of discrimination as being people who were at risk of some sort of social 
marginalization as a result of discrimination, and they are the ones that tended not 
to have a voice in social partnership’ (COM151). Industry, by contrast, was 
consulted only to provide information that would allow the Commission to follow its 
goal of greater market equality. To gain a better understanding of where the 
technical requirements of risk-based assessments for capital adequacy end and 
individual business interests begin, the drafting DG EMPL consulted industry early 
on in the drafting process for the 2008 proposal (COM42 and COM19). On the 
basis of the acquired knowledge, the Commission was able to argue that the 
question as to whether existing rules and practices had to be changed depended 
on the product and on whether justification could be provided ‘on the basis of 
accurate and up-to-date data’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2008: 
42). The proactive and selective distribution of access for interests from different 
                                                                                                         
4 Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Commission proposal 
COM(2008)426). 




societal segments by DG EMPL clearly contradicts the presumed neutrality of the 
regulator that a purely efficiency-enhancing model would imply.  
Finally, with respect to the conflict structure inside the Commission, both the 
decision to have equal treatment legislation on financial services and the more 
concrete implications this would have for insurers in their actuarial practices were 
debated among central actors inside and outside the Commission, reflecting 
substantial differences in the underlying understandings of markets. Inside the 
Commission, DG MARKT, especially, defended the positions of industry – ‘various 
financial sector federations’ (COM42) and those member states where ‘the practice 
of differentiating insurance costs [...] were very, very strong. UK, Ireland, but also 
Germany’ (COM21) – by trying to carry out ‘a damage limitation exercise’ 
(COM19). DG ENTR was fundamentally opposed to having a binding act at all, and 
especially the broad 2008 directive, because they did not consider this a regulatory 
issue to be tackled at community level and feared costs for enterprises through the 
intervention (COM81). For these actors inside the Commission, the ideal regulatory 
position was for ‘insurance to be [kept] completely out’ (COM21). In contrast, DG 
EMPL, holding the pen and largely acting on normative grounds, was strongly in 
favour of the acts (COM21, Commissioner Diamantopoulou in Minder, 2003a), but 
had to overcome opposition from the critical portfolios inside the Commission as 
well as from opposing member states and organized interests. 
The third case is the initiation of consumer credit regulation proposed by the 
Commission in 2002.5 Supranational regulation had existed beforehand, but it had 
left member states with the possibility of protecting their consumers unilaterally, so 
that myriad different regulations on consumer credit persisted in Europe. These 
barriers became increasingly relevant as consumer credit became the ‘lubricant of 
economic life’ (COM89), amounting to 7 percent of the EU-15 GDP and exhibiting 
an upward trend (COM119, Commission of the European Communities, 2002: 3). 
For the Commission’s internal market Directorate-General (DG MARKT), differing 
national regimes hampered growth and thus needed to be removed (COM119, 
COM89). However, unlike most other regulations on financial services, it was not 
DG MARKT but the newly established consumer-policy DG SANCO, that was 
assigned responsibility for the regulation, and the latter DG pursued a rationale that 
went way beyond the facilitation of cross-border trade. 
In fact, DG SANCO officials aimed at protecting the ‘weak consumer’ (COM89). 
Drafting was based on the assumption that the consumer was not able to fully 
grasp the implications of credit agreements and thus needed to be protected 
against the exploitation of that very fact by the banking or retail industry. This 
position was informed by observing individual cases of immensely over-indebted 
consumers, but also by the hype surrounding ‘behavioural economics’ at the time 
(COM89). This resulted in the redistributive ‘ambition […] to create a very 
comprehensive, very exhaustive consumer credit regulation which would be 
burdensome for industry’, and DG SANCO officials transferred the most stringent 
national regulations they could find to the proposal (COM89), thereby increasing 
consumer protection rather than harmonizing at the level of the lowest common 
denominator.  
DG SANCO’s equality-enhancing approach can be highlighted by means of some 
of the key regulatory provisions, in which especially the principle of responsible 
lending was contested. The proposal fully obliged creditors to assess before the 
agreement whether the consumer was actually able to honour the credit obligations 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002: article 9). The banking industry 
                                                                                                         
5 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning credit for consumers – 
COM(2003)443. This proposal was intended to repeal the existing supranational law in the area, as 
entailed in Directive 87/102/EEC. 
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was shocked (ESBG, 2003: 7-9), whereas consumer associations were highly 
satisfied. In addition, the responsible lending principle stirred up significant internal 
conflict with DG MARKT (COM89; COM90). Another heatedly contested issue was 
the way in which the total costs of credit should be communicated to the consumer, 
encapsulated in the annual percentage rate (APR). Compared to the regulatory 
status quo, DG SANCO’s proposal included a range of additional cost elements 
such as notary fees or even insurance premiums, meaning that creditors would 
have to disclose costs that went beyond their control. This rule, in particular, 
highlights the fact that DG SANCO was pursuing a regulatory approach involving 
direct and conclusive rules governing the market. The banking industry defied this 
as ‘unworkable’ (ESBG, 2003: 10), and was internally supported by DG MARKT 
(COM89). Finally, for credits linked to particular consumer goods, the proposed 
regulation would render creditors liable for defective products purchased on credit 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2002: article 19) – a regulatory 
approach borrowed from the UK Consumer Credit Act which was considered 
‘totally outlandish’ in other EU states (COM89). The banking industry ‘strongly 
opposed’ it (ESBG, 2003: 12), again backed internally by DG MARKT (COM119). 
But DG SANCO stuck once more with the most stringent rule it could find amongst 
the member state regimes, did not try to balance competing interests and was 
applauded by the consumer side (EURO COOP, 2003; also BEUC, 2002: 14-5). 
In sum, DG SANCO proposed a regulation that was geared towards equal 
protection for consumers in the European market. However, this regulation could 
only come about because inefficiencies had persisted in that market beforehand. 
These provided the basic justification for regulation, but the intentional focus on 
weak market participants and DG SANCO’s need to demarcate its competences 
from those of the internal market DG resulted in a proposal that clearly aimed at 
redistributing rights in line with an equality-enhancing motivation. Not least, the 
high level of protection entailed in the regulation was driven by the political aim of 
protecting consumers in credit markets. Merely enhancing efficiency by removing 
regulatory barriers would ‘deliver a bad message’ politically and would be ‘a very 
difficult position for the Commission’ to be in (COM119). 
The clear focus on only one societal segment was also mirrored in interest-group 
access. It is important to note that stakeholder meetings on the issue indicated a 
‘clear desire’ from the consumer associations (COM111) as well as ‘unanimous’ 
opposition from the industry side. In response to this outright industry 
disagreement, ‘further consultation was entirely avoided’ by DG SANCO (ESBG, 
2003: 2-3), so that ‘the industry felt that it had been very much disregarded in the 
process’ (COM119). 
This intentionally skewed interest-group involvement also affected internal 
interaction with DG MARKT, which ‘had more the ear […] to the banking sector’ 
(COM111). DG MARKT officials felt that banking interests were ‘not being properly 
consulted’ (COM119), which pushed the Directors-General of both DGs to the 
drafting table early on and resulted in a blockade of the formal inter-service 
consultation. As in the earlier case, these more fundamental questions were 
subject to exchange among Commissioners about the quality of markets, so that ‘in 
the end it [was] a political decision’ (COM89).  
As predicted by the equality-enhancing model of regulation, redistribution of rights 
among producers and consumers was an aim rather than a constraint, detailed 
rules rather than self-regulation along predefined objectives were prescribed, and a 
neo-pluralist style of communicating with external stakeholder contacts coincided 
with a political bargaining process among the relevant actors within the 
Commission. 




Conclusion: Social equality through the market? 
The case studies emphasize that regulatory decision-making in the EU can follow 
an equality-enhancing type of regulation and thereby take an identifiable middle 
ground between traditional welfare-state models and purely efficiency-focused 
regulation. Against this view, the social embeddedness of Europe’s internal market 
cannot be considered as automatic as contemporary writing often seems to imply. 
Instead, our analysis suggests that market retrenchment at the supranational level 
depends on the outcome of political struggles across, and especially within the 
regulatory institutions of the EU. Where the regulator pursues social equality rather 
than solely focusing on market efficiency, the regulatory processes differ strongly in 
terms of their basic rationale, the chosen intervention, the type of stakeholder 
access and the internal conflict during rule formulation. 
Initially, prevailing inefficiencies in the European Single Market were the starting 
point of rule-making in all three cases examined. And in the two equality-enhancing 
processes, the favoured societal group had to be framed as active participants in 
the regulated market. But rather than addressing such market failures by means of 
the least intrusive rule-making geared towards self-regulation, the regulators 
responded with encompassing and conclusive rules. Furthermore, the respective 
leading Commission DGs fostered and then counted on the support of consumer 
associations or a broad coalition of anti-discrimination NGOs and intentionally 
disregarded the input of other affected market stakeholders. Stakeholder access 
followed a neo-pluralist pattern and deviated from unbiased access in the classical 
conception of the regulatory state, but also from the corporatist pattern ascribed to 
the positive state. And, finally, the equality-enhancing processes led to strong 
internal opposition from other Commission DGs that would have preferred less 
intrusive regulatory measures. 
Several implications follow for the broader question as to under which conditions 
market regulation in the EU pursues wider social goals. Initially, we noted that both 
the equal-treatment and the consumer-policy cases were driven by the agency of 
actors within the Commission. Equality or efficiency enhancement is always 
pursued by some and not by others. To answer the question as to whether we can 
expect Brussels to intervene only where markets fail or also where social interests 
demand regulation, we need a disaggregated view on Europe's central regulator. 
On the one hand, this refers to entrepreneurial actors in the drafting DGs. But for 
both cases it was also important that the Directorates-General held a decidedly 
social mandate due to their portfolios and could rely on treaty bases justified along 
equality-enhancing lines. Delineating their own competences from traditionally 
efficiency-oriented DGs, political entrepreneurs within the lead departments explain 
the push for more equality, while the available institutional mandates explain how 
the aim of social equality could be pursued. This finding suggests that a 
politicization of the selection of key personnel (Hartlapp, 2014, forthcoming) and 
the layout of portfolios within the Commission may significantly advance the social 
embeddedness of European integration. 
But against this hope, it has to be noted that the apparent need to frame 
beneficiaries of equality-enhancing regulation as market participants still limits the 
scope for European re-regulation. Compared to the positive state at the national 
level, where social policy often targets those not able to participate in the 
marketplace, doubts remain as to whether the regulatory processes at the 
supranational level can really work to the benefit of market outsiders. Related to 
this, one has to keep in mind that the equality-enhancing model is also limited to 
the regulatory section of the overall social policy spectrum. In other words, equality 
enhancement in the Commission context means a redistribution of individual rights 
rather than resources. In a positive account, many see the fundamental rights 
agenda as completing the political union (Caporaso et al., 2009). Given the EU’s 
institutional difficulties in enacting actual resource transfers, aggravated by the 
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increasing heterogeneity of political preferences in the Council, individual rights 
provide much better opportunities for social embeddedness because they cut 
across traditional conflict lines. What is more, the proactive redistribution of rights 
can help to make the EU ‘loveable’ (to allude to the famous phrase by Delors that 
‘you cannot love a market’). However, from a more critical perspective, the shift 
towards regulating individual rights calls into question the traditional logic of welfare 
provision in the ‘positive’ state through social security, corporatist actors and 
macroeconomic stabilization. Individual rights increase the autonomy of citizens in 
a market setting, but they may endanger the notion of solidarity across social 
groups. In times when most western societies are characterized by ever-growing 
disparities, this might be a fatal development - even more so where the emphasis 
on individual rights undermines solidarity institutions that have evolved historically, 
for example in national labour or tax law (Scharpf, 2010; Höpner et al., 2012). 
In sum, this article highlights the fact that political actors can exploit European 
regulation as a means to achieve broader societal goals, but are forced to take a 
detour via market efficiency. Put differently, while social policy in the positive state 
sought to decommodify individuals from the market, EU regulatory policy reflects 
actor interests in order to change the process and outcome of existing market 
transactions. In conclusion, there is scope for a social embedding of the European 
internal market in principle, but it is constrained by its institutional foundation, the 
existence of proactive agents within the Commission, a focus on market 
participants and the mere redistribution of rights rather than resources.  
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